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Abstract 
The adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs) in different countries of the world has 
become a contemporary issue especially with respect to 
the reliability of financial statements. The study 
examined the impact of valuation of Loan Loss Provisions 
(LLPs) on earnings management and capital management 
during the pre and post-adoption of IFRS for listed 
deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. Using an Ex-post 
facto research design approach, this study utilised 
secondary data extracted from annual reports and 
accounts of fifteen (15) DMBs for the period of ten (10) 
years from 2006 – 2016. The results from the use of 
multiple regression analysis revealed a significant 
positive relationship between LLPs and earnings 
management for both pre and post-IFRS adoption. 
Furthermore, the study also found a positive insignificant 
relationship between LLPs and capital management for 
both pre and post IFRS adoption. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The increasing growth in cross-border financial transactions, international trade, and 
investments; which unavoidably involves the preparation and presentation of accounting 
reports. With the increasing globalisation of the marketplace, international investors need 
access to financial information based on harmonized accounting standards and procedures 
(Beke, 2011). These reports are useful across various national borders and have brought 
about the development of International Accounting Standard (IAS) which was first 
published in 1975 by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Since then, 
the process for setting international accounting standards has undergone substantial 
evolution, culminating in the 2001 restructuring of the IASC into the International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB). International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) 
are accounting standards developed by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB). Many countries have adopted the IFRS as their official domestic accounting 
standards. Each country adopting IFRS undergoes a transition process in the year of 
adoption. This process may be fairly disruptive for users of financial statements as 
accounting treatments of similar items may vary, and impair comparability and trend 
analysis. The IFRSs provide provision to remove allowable accounting alternatives (that 
existed in most countries under their respective local GAAPs) and requires accounting 
measurements that better reflect a firm’s economic position and performance.  
In Nigeria, the prudential guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria and the 
Statement of Accounting Standards form the Nigerian GAAP. It is mandatory for the Deposit 
Money Banks to comply with the stipulated guidelines in valuation of Loan Loss Provisions 
and loan balances in the financial statements. The Nigerian GAAP insist on loan 
classification into performing and non-performing (substandard, doubtful and lost) while 
IFRS is based on fair value measurement of loan portfolio. In essence, IFRSs are precise, 
admit an insufficient number of options, and prohibit hidden reserves. Based on this, the 
adoption of IFRS is expected to significantly reduce the ability to engage in earnings 
management behaviour. That is IFRS limit the opportunity for management to engage 
opportunistic behaviour by limiting the accounting options available to them (Barth, 
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Landsman & Lang 2008). International Accounting Standard (IAS) No. 39 provide guidance 
on how loan loss provisions (LLPs) should be established and limits the ability of managers 
to exercise flexibility in determining the provision (IASB, 2003). If the ability to use LLPs to 
manage earnings is limited, then there will be evidence of lower earnings management in 
post-IFRS. Prior research shows that loan loss provisions (LLPs) are primarily used as a 
tool for earnings management and capital management by listed banks (Ahmed, Neel & 
Wang, 2010; Anandarajan, Hasan & Lozano-Vivas, 2003; Anandarajan, Hasan & McCarthy, 
2007; Ozili, 2015). However, the attention on the use of discretion to manage earnings 
received global impetus after the Enron crises and many other similar cases that followed. 
The main focus among the companies that were affected both in the U.S. and other parts of 
the world was financial irregularities, which reiterated the need for a better grasp of 
earnings management among practitioners, regulators and those in the academia.  
Previous studies have identified that loan losses are one of the major causes of these 
financial crises and its provision has a direct impact on firms’ cash flows and consequently 
the reported earnings (Chang, Shen, & Fang,  2008; Mohammad, Wasiuzzaman, & Zaini, 
2011). The agenda of many regulatory bodies responding to the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
is the loan provisioning (EFRAG 2009). And also, the arguments of what should comprise 
regulatory capital varied by country with each country’s regulatory body setting their 
respective levels and standards. To overcome this and to level the competitive conditions 
for banks across different countries, the Basel committee issued two accords (Busch 2009). 
Basel I introduced minimum capital requirements (Tier 1 and Tier II). The requirements of 
this accord subsequently extended to more than a hundred countries worldwide. However, 
Basel I inadvertently created loopholes which, according to Anandarajan et al. (2003) and 
Pérez, Salas-Fumá, and Saurina, (2008) enabled banks to engage in more aggressive 
earnings management. IFRS aims to ensure that loan loss provisions adequately reflect the 
current risk of losses, by adjusting historical provisions to prevailing economic 
circumstances at the time of reporting - IFRS uses the concept of discounted cash flows 
measurement method (KPMG, 2007). However, Bank regulators continue to stress that 
LLPs should be sufficient to minimise loan loss on bank loan portfolio, also emerging 
empirical studies suggest that bank managers may have another incentive(s) to influence 
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or manipulate reported loan loss provision estimates other than mitigating expected credit 
loss. Three arguments support the reason why banks manipulate earnings: signalling 
argument, income smoothing or earnings management argument and capital management 
argument (Zhou & Chen, 2004). And also earnings management argument holds that 
managers increase the provision for loan losses in periods when earnings are high, under 
the assumption of income smoothing (Beatty, Chamberlin & Mogliolo, 1995; Collins, 
Shackleford & Wahlen, 1995; Rivard, Blind & Morris, 2003). This study therefore seeks to 
examine the impact of IFRS adoption on financial reporting practice in the Nigerian 
banking sector. 
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of IFRS adoption on financial 
reporting practice in the Nigeria banking sector. Consequently, the study hypothesized 
that; H01: The valuation of LLPs has no significant influence on earnings management after 
IFRS adoption by listed banks in Nigeria.  
H02: LLPs has no significant impact on capital management after the IFRS adoption by listed 
banks in Nigeria. 
2.0  Literature Review 
2.1  Earnings Management 
Earnings are a central part of financial statements that help a large number of stakeholders 
to evaluate firms’ performance. Stakeholders include current investors, potential investors, 
creditors, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders. Stakeholders use the reported 
financial information to measure managers’ performance, deciding compensation plans 
and assessing the future of the company. Reported financial information influences the 
investor capital allocation decisions (Xu, Taylor & Dugan 2007). Since earnings is a major 
and central part for management compensation decisions and investor’s decision making, it 
create incentives for managers to practice earnings management. 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as a means management’s use of 
judgment through financial reporting and structuring transactions to conceal the true 
economic performance of an entity. Earnings management motives are broadly classified as 
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either opportunistic which exemplifies the classic agency problem; or signaling- which 
signals private information to capital markets (Beaver, 2002). Kirschenheiter and Melumad 
(2002) described earnings management as when a manager intentionally uses judgment 
and assessments to skew earnings towards a desired outcome. According to them, 
Managers often use manipulating activities to maximize reported earnings. Income 
maximization is one the more common purposes for using earnings management. However, 
the opposite is Big- Bath accounting where managers radically decrease earnings, 
providing the possibility to report positive earnings in future years. 
Ahmed, Takeda & Thomas (1999) simply described earnings management as smoothing 
earnings while Copeland (1968) defined the concept as “the repetitive selection of 
accounting measurement or reporting rules in a particular pattern, the effect of which is to 
report a stream of income with a smaller variation from trend than would otherwise have 
appeared”. Earnings management is a strategy employed by management of a company to 
deliberately manipulate the company’s earnings so that the figures match a predetermined 
target. Income smoothing is another reason why managers manipulate earnings. Managers 
attempt to maintain a steady level of earnings in order to secure employment. If earnings 
for the current period are high and projected future earnings are low, managers intend to 
reserve current earnings, creating a possibility of capitalization in the future, referred to as 
cookie-jar accounting (DeFond & Park, 1997). 
There are two methods that could be used for earnings management. First, one could use 
the flexibility allowed in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to change 
reported earnings without changing the underlying (past) cash flows, which Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) describe as usage of managerial judgment in financial reporting. This is 
called accounting earnings management. Second, a manager may change operating 
decisions, such as delivery schedule or maintenance, in order to manage the underlying 
cash flows that will affect the reported income reports, which is being described as 
structuring of transactions by Healy and Wahlen. This kind of management is usually 
referred to as economic earnings management. 
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According to Healy and Wahlen (1999); Graham (2005) if stakeholders believe that 
managers possess information that is not transparent to stakeholder, they might assume 
and accept a degree of earnings management being exercised. This indicates that if a firm 
reports an earning decreases or a loss, stakeholders will assume that earnings management 
already has been practiced to avoid reporting a decrease in earnings or to report a loss. If a 
firm report a small loss, the capital markets will punish the firm severely due to the 
assumption of exhausted manipulation activities from the firm to meet zero earnings 
benchmark. 
According to Roman (2009) “Earnings management occurs when firm management has the 
opportunity to make accounting decisions that change reported income and exploit those 
opportunities”. He also stated that accounting for business operations requires judgment 
and estimates. For example, one can’t measure revenue without estimating when 
customers will pay, how many will not pay, how many will return goods for refund and 
costs to the seller for fulfillment of warranty or maintenance promises. Earnings 
management is the premeditated dulling of variations about some level of earnings 
considered to be normal for the organization. 
2.2  Loan Loss Provision 
According to the revised Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Prudential Guidelines (Paragraph 
12.1) 2010, licensed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) are to make adequate provisions for 
perceived losses based on the credit portfolio classification system prescribed that, in 
order to reflect their true financial condition. Two types of provisions (that is, specific and 
general) are considered adequate to achieve the objectives. Specific provision are made on 
the basis of perceived risk of default on specific credit facilities while general provisions 
are made in recognition of the fact that even performing credit facility harbor some risk of 
loan no matter how small. Paragraph 12.3 of the Guidelines provide that, when IFRS is 
adopted in Nigeria, Banks were required to make provisions for loans as prescribed in the 
relevant IFRS Standards. 
Provisions for loans recognized in the profit and loss account should be determined based 
on the requirements of IFRS. However, the IFRS provisions should be compared with 
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provision determined under prudential guidelines and the expected impact/changes in 
general reserve should be treated as follows: Prudential Provision is greater than IFRS 
provision; transfer the difference from the general reserve to a non-distributable 
regulatory reserve. Prudential Provision is less than IFRS provision; the excess charges 
resulting should be transferred from the regulatory reserve account to the general reserve 
to the extent of the non-distributable reserve previously recognized. The non-distributable 
reserve should be classified under Tier 1 as part of core capital. 
Grey and Clarke (2004) explained Loan loss provision as an expense on the income 
statement which signifies managers’ assessment of expected future losses. This means that 
an increase in loan loss provision reduces net income, while a fall in loan losses increases 
net income. Since it is the result of managers’ assessment of the likely loss that the 
company would incur should the borrower fail to repay his obligations as at when due, the 
provision for it is considered to have two (2) portions: non-discretionary and discretionary 
portions. “Non-discretionary is a function of specific quality determinants in the loan 
portfolio- non-accrual loans, renegotiated loans, loans past due over 90 days, specific 
analyses on troubled large credits, usually implying internal grading system. In order to 
influence earnings, banks make large provision for loan losses. It was revealed that banks 
in the U.S provided inadequate loan losses to understate net assets and profits. Since it is 
the result of managers’ assessment of the likely loss that the company would incur should 
the borrower fail to repay his obligations as at when due, the provision for it is considered 
to have two (2) portions; the non-discretionary portion is the provision that is based on 
fair and objective analysis of the firm’s economic conditions, while Mohammad et al. (2011) 
pointed that, the discretionary portion are those accruals that largely depend on the 
outcome of the managers’ future expectation of uncertain events. However, the attention 
on the use of discretion to manage earnings received global impetus after the Enron crises 
and many other similar cases that followed. The main focus among the companies that 
were affected both in the U.S. and other parts of the world was financial irregularities, 
which reiterated the need for better grasp of earnings management among practitioners, 
regulators and those in the academia. (Chang et al. 2008 and Mohammad et al. 2011). 
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2.3  Capital Management 
The Rules governing regulatory capital, its components and required deductions to the 
capital levels, shall be applied by banks for assessment of qualifying capital. Banks are 
required to maintain a minimum regulatory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 15% on an on-
going basis. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) will take into account the relevant risk 
factors and the internal capital adequacy assessments of each bank to ensure that the 
capital held by a bank is commensurate with the bank’s overall risk profile. This would 
include, among others, the effectiveness of the bank’s risk management systems in 
identifying, assessing / measuring, monitoring and managing various risks including 
interest rate risk in the banking book, liquidity risk, concentration risk and residual risk.  
Accordingly, CBN will consider prescribing a higher level of minimum capital ratio for each 
bank under the Pillar 2 framework on the basis of their respective risk profiles and their 
risk management systems. Furthermore, in terms of the Pillar 2 requirements of the capital 
adequacy framework, banks are expected to operate at a level well above the minimum 
requirement. (see CBN Guidance Notes on Regulatory Capital 2015). Capital adequacy 
refers to the amount of capital held by Nigerian deposit insurance corporation (NDIC) to 
cover losses. The CBN currently requires capital adequacy requirements for NDIC to be 
based on  
the Bank for International Settlements Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (1988) 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, commonly 
known as the Basel Accord. The intention of the Basel Accord was to ensure that a 
consistent standard be applied when determining minimum capital requirements across 
internationally active banks. Under the rules of the Basel Accord, capital for supervisory 
purposes is now considered in two tiers: Tier I and Tier II. Tier I (core capital) comprises 
the highest-quality capital elements. Tier I capital is defined as the sum of book value of 
equity (common stock and retained earnings), qualifying non-cumulative perpetual 
preferred stock, and minority interest in equity accounts of subsidiaries less goodwill and 
other intangible assets. Tier II (supplementary capital) is made up of other elements that 
contribute to the overall strength of a bank as a going concern but do not satisfy all of the 
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characteristics of Tier I capital. Tier II capital is the sum of loan loss reserves (up to a 
maximum of 1.25% of risk weighted assets), perpetual preferred stock, hybrid capital 
instruments, perpetual debt, mandatory convertible debt securities, term subordinated 
debt, and intermediate preferred stock. A bank’s capital base is the sum of its Tier I and 
Tier II capital less any deductions. At least 50% of a bank’s capital base must be Tier I 
capital. The Basel Accord requires that the ratio of a bank’s capital to risk weighted assets 
(referred to as the capital adequacy ratio) must be at least 8%. 
2.4  Review of Empirical Studies 
Ozili and Outa (2017) reviewed the recent academic and policy literature on bank loan loss 
provisioning (LLP) to identify several advances in the literature and observed that there 
exists some major advancement in country-specific and cross-country analyses and 
substantial interaction between LLPs and existing prudential, accounting, institutional firm 
characteristic, cultural, religious, tax and fiscal framework. Ozili (2017) investigated 
whether discretionary ‘loan loss provisioning’ by Western European banks is driven by 
income smoothing or credit risk considerations. The study used the ordinary least square 
regression to examine the relationship between loan loss provision and earnings before tax 
and loan loss provisions in the post-financial crisis period. The findings of the study 
revealed that listed banks in Western Europe carryout discretionary provisioning which is 
driven by income smoothing incentives in the post-financial crisis period. The study also 
observed that discretionary provisioning is significantly influenced by credit risk factors, 
mainly, non-performing loans and loan growth. Overall, the implication of the results of the 
study is that discretionary provisioning among Western European banks is driven by both 
income smoothing and credit risk considerations. 
Sanyaolu, Iyoha and Ojeka (2017) examined the effect of adopted International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on the earning yield (EY) and earning per share (EPS) 
of quoted banks in Nigeria. The study made used of cross sectional data obtained for a 
period of 6 years from 2009 to 2014, while the panel ordinary least method of analysis was 
used to examine the impact of IFRS adoption on the earnings of all 15 quoted banks in the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study found a significant and positive relationship between 
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IFRS adoption and the earnings yield of quoted banks in Nigeria. The study also found a 
significant and positive relationship between IFRS adoption and EPS of quoted banks in 
Nigeria. The study concludes that IFRS adoption has improved the decision making 
capability of the various stakeholders, thus, increasing investor confidence and the inflow 
of capital in the country through foreign direct investment. 
Bello, Abubakar, and Adeyemi (2016) investigated the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management of non-financial quoted companies in Nigeria. They utilized a sample of 
seventy-five non-financial quoted companies in Nigeria that have consistently published 
their audited annual financial reports between 2010 and 2014. They used a dummy 
variable to separate period of pre and post adoption period; before January 2012 and year-
end 2014. The data collected were subjected to descriptive analysis, correlation analysis 
and a panel multiple regression analysis to explore both trends and possible effects of IFRS 
adoption on general earnings management. Their findings revealed that IFRS adoption in 
Nigeria does not significantly affect the tendency of Nigerian companies to manipulate 
earnings. Explicitly, this is contrary to the general belief that IFRS, as high quality 
accounting standards will reduce the possibility of earnings management. 
Eneje and Paul (2016) examined the effect of IFRS adoption on the mechanics of loan loss 
provisioning for Nigerian Banks. Specifically, it analyzed how the change in the recognition 
and measurement of loan loss provision affects the accounting quality of banks thereby 
reducing the income smoothing behavior of the money deposit banks. Ordinary least 
square multiple regression analysis was used to analyse secondary data obtained from the 
annual reports and accounts of deposit money banks covering the period of 2005 to 2015. 
The findings of the study revealed that the post-IFRS has had significant effects on the 
mechanics of loan loss provisioning compared to the pre IFRS era in the Nigerian Money 
Deposit Banks. Their study recommended that banks CEO’s should actively sensitize fresh 
accountants and auditors who are yet to be acquainted with IFRS guidelines and standards. 
Nugrahanti (2015) investigated the impact of risk assessment using the risk inherent and 
quality implementation of quality risk management in the operational activities of banking 
operations to earnings management practices through loan loss provisions. The 
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investigator used data pool from 2012 through 2014. Base on the purposive sampling 
method, 36 listed banks on the Stock Exchange Indonesian were selected as sample of the 
study. A panel data multivariate regression methodology was used. The findings of the 
study showed that risk assessment strengthens the decrease in the earning management 
implementation after the adoption of IFRS in IAS No. 39 and Basel II Accord generally 
evidence to improve I bank’s financial report quality. 
Umoren and Enang, (2015) examined whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS has 
improved the value relevance of financial information in the financial statements of 
commercial banks in Nigeria. The sample comprises of twelve listed banks in Nigeria. 
Specifically, financial statement figures of 2010 and 2011 (pre-adoption period) and 2012 
and 2013 (post-adoption) were utilized. Descriptive statistics and least square regression 
were conducted to analyze the effect of IFRS adoption on the accounting quality. The result 
indicated that the equity value and earnings of banks are relatively value relevant to share 
prices under IFRS than under the previous Nigerian SAS. Results also indicate that earnings 
per share is incrementally value relevant during post-IFRS period while book value of 
equity per share is incrementally less value relevant during the post-IFRS period. 
Yahaya, Kutigi, and Mohammed, (2015) investigated how the change in the recognition and 
measurement of banks’ loan loss provision affects earnings management behavior. They 
investigated the post adoption off IFRS and value relevance of accounting information of 
quoted banks in Nigeria. Using the price model and the return model, their study found that 
the EPS increased in the post adoption than in the pre adoption periods. The study 
concluded that the restriction to incur losses under IFRS significantly reduced the ability of 
banks to engage in earnings manipulation. The study recommended that investors should 
understand the IFRS adoption process so as to avoid overvaluation of the economy when 
the financial markets are doing well. 
Ahmed, Mohammed and Adisa (2014) explored the relationship between loan loss 
provision and earnings management in Nigerian DMBs. Secondary data were obtained from 
the 8 banks’ annual reports for the period of 2006 to 2011 and robust regression was used 
as a tool for data analysis. The result indicated that there is a positive relationship between 
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the provision for loan losses and earnings management in Nigerian DMBs. Trabelsi, Hamza 
& Chila (2013) examined the effect of IFRS on earnings quality in European Stock Market 
using the sample of 250 French companies listed on Euronext Paris from 2002-2007, the 
study found that IFRS adoption resulted in a significant improvement of value relevance of 
earnings. This implies that market valuation is less associated with earnings prepared in 
line with IFRS than those prepared under IFRS. The explanatory power of earnings 
improved significantly after the transition to international standards. 
Tanko (2012) examined financial performance measures on some selected Nigerian banks 
that are quoted under the Nigerian stock market under the IFRS regime. The study used 
regression model to examine the banks financial performance. The study defined the 
change in performance based on two parameters. First, change in accounting quality 
(earnings management and timely loss recognition). Secondly, the performance of the firms 
based on changes on identified financial rations of the firms. The study test the impact of 
adoption as it relates to profitability, growth, leverage, and liquidity performance. Multiple 
logit regression and t-test were used in the analysis. The study finds that variability of 
earnings has decreased which suggest that there was low variability in earnings in the post 
IFRS adoption period. Timely loss recognition is the measure for prevalence of large 
negative earnings where large negative net income to be positive which signifies that IFRS 
firms recognize losses more frequently in the post adoption period than they do in the pre 
adoption period, the study conclude that accounting quality improves after the adoption of 
IFRS. They study also find that under IFRS, firms exhibit higher values on profitability 
measure, such as earnings per share (EPS). The study concludes by recommending 
comprehensive implementation of IFRS and that SEC and external auditors should monitor 
and ensure strict compliance with the adoption and provision of standards. 
Leventis, Dimihopoulos and Anandaraja (2011) used a sample of 91 EU listed commercial 
banks covering a period of ten years (before and after implementation of IFRS), they 
dichotomize their sample into early and late adopters. They found that earnings 
management (using loan loss provisions) for both early and late adopters while significant 
over the estimation window is significantly reduced after implementation of IFRS. They 
also find that, for risky banks, earnings management behavior is more pronounced when 
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compared to the less risky banks, but is significantly reduced in the post IFRS period. 
Capital management behavior by bank managers is not significant in both pre and posts 
IFRS regimes. Their study conclude that the implementation of IFRS in the EU appears to 
have improved earnings quality by mitigating the tendency of bank managers of listed 
commercial banks to engage in earnings management using loan loss provisions. 
Outa (2011) investigated if the adoption of IFRSs in Kenya has been associated with higher 
accounting quality for listed companies. The study applied accounting quality measures; 
earnings management, timely loss recognition and value relevance. The methodology is 
based on prior literature definition of metrics of accounting quality mainly earnings 
management, timely loss recognition and value relevance. The outcomes are mixed 
(accounting quality had marginally improved and declined) and are very much in line with 
findings in other studies. Nina, Bernhard, Christopher and Ann-Kristin (2009) analyzed a 
large sample of German firms in the period from 1998 to 2008 found that voluntary and 
mandatory adopters differ distinctively in terms of essential firm characteristics. Result 
from their findings indicates that earnings management in the post-adoption period are 
mixed. While income smoothing decreases for voluntary but not for mandatory adopters, 
discretionary accruals only decrease for mandatory but not for voluntary adopters. 
Anandarajan, Hasan and McCarthy (2005) examined whether Australian banks engage in 
earnings, capital management and signaling, and, if so, the extent to which loan loss 
provisions (LLPs) are used for this purpose. Their results indicated that banks in Australia 
used loan loss provisions to manage earnings. Furthermore, listed commercial banks 
engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs than other banks. 
Anandarajan et al (2005) also found that earnings management behavior is more 
pronounced after implementation of the Basel Accord.  However, they did not find evidence 
to indicate a relationship between LLPs and capital management.  This may be because 
loan loss reserves no longer constitute part of Tier I capital in the numerator of the capital 
adequacy ratio. Overall, the found a significant understating of loan loss provisions in the 
post-Basel period relative to the pre-Basel period. It indicated that reported earnings may 
not reflect the true economic reality underlying those numbers.  They concluded that, 
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Australian banks do not appear to use LLPs for signaling future intentions of higher 
earnings to investors. 
The concept of signaling was first studied in the context of job market by Akerlof (1970). 
While, Spence (1973) developed the signal equilibrium theory which provided that a good 
firm can distinguish itself from a bad firm by sending signal about its quality to capital 
markets. Signals have become useful tools for obtaining financial reports from 
management to potential investors. The theory also argued that a signal is a perceivable 
action or structure that is intended to or has evolved to indicate an otherwise not 
perceivable quality about the signaler or the signaler’s environment. i.e., the purpose of a 
signal is to indicate a certain quality - Signaling by banks using Loan Loss Provision (LLPs). 
He also argued that the existence of information asymmetric can also be taken as a reason 
for good companies to use financial information to send signal to the market.   
This study adopts signaling theory due to its focus on intentional disclosure of positive 
information. Signal is the information disclosed from the financial statements. However, 
bank managers known as the signalers have an incentive to manipulate the financial 
statements to get decision makers to act as preferred by the managers. 
3.0 Methodology 
The Ex-post facto research design is used in this study. The population of the study 
comprise of all listed deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria from the period 2006–2016, 
taken from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) official website. Though there are 22 banks 
that were listed by the NSE as at 2016, 15 banks were selected for this study. The 15 banks 
meet the following criteria: 
(i) Banks that their complete annual reports is readily available and accessible to 
the researcher within the period under consideration,  
(ii) Banks that had their toxic assets purchased by AMCOM due to their inability to 
meet the CBN September 30, 2011 deadline to fully recapitalize or be liquidated, 
were excluded from this study.  
(iii) And finally, banks that have not received any form of bailout by CBN within the 
period of the study.  
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Secondary data was used in this study and extracted from the annual reports and 
accounts of the banks for the periods under review. The data was collected over a 
period of 10 years which covers pre-IFRS adoption and post-IFRS adoption, ranging 
from 2006-2016, excluding 2011 which is the year of adoption. The period from 2006 – 
2010 form the pre-adoption, while 2012 – 2016 form the post-adoption. The model 
used for testing the earnings and capital management hypotheses is a modified and 
extended version of the cross-sectional model used by Leventis, Dimitropoulos and 
Anandarajan (2011) in equations 3.1 and 3.2   
LLPit = β0 + β1EBTit + β2NPL  + β3SIZEit + β4AGEit + β5ΔLLAit + β6CFEERit + e ... (3.1) it
LLPit = γ0 + γ1MCARit + γ2NPLit + γ3SIZEit + γ4AGEit + γ5ΔLLAit + γ6CFEERit + e … (3.2)  
Where: β0-6 and γ0-6 are the coefficient of parameters to be estimated. The dependent 
variable in this study is LLP (proxy for loan loss provision to total loans outstanding). The 
independent or explanatory variables are EBT (proxy for earnings management) and MCAR 
(Capital Management), while NPL, SIZE, AGE, ΔLLA and CFEER are control variables. Three 
models (Random effect, Fixed effect, and Pool effect model) was formulated for each 
scenarios; that is, model with EBT and model with MCAR both for pre-IFRS and post-IFRS. 
The variables are measured thus: 
LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
EBT = ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets 
MCAR = ratio of actual regulatory capital (tier 1 capital) before loan loss reserves to the 
minimum required regulatory capital 
NPL = ratio of loans and advances to customers divided by total bank total asset  
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
AGE = no. of years the bank has been in operation from the date being quoted on the 
Nigeria Stock Exchange 
ΔLLA = change in loan losses /total assets 
CFEER = commission and fee income to total assets 
e = error term which capture other variables not included in the model 
 
 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/3 (2018) 170-197 
185 
 
4.0  Results  
 
Table 4.1 Pre-IFRS and Post-IFRS Adoption MODEL with Earnings Management 
 
Regressors 
Random effect model Random effect model 
Β p-value Β p-value 
EBT 0.3027 0.0000 0.6570 0.0000 
NPL 0.0259 0.5607 0.0496 0.2611 
SIZE -0.0046 0.1896 -0.0134 0.0002 
AGE 0.0003 0.5255 -0.0003 0.6882 
LLA 0.0706 0.4981 0.0520 0.6080 
CFEER 1.0070 0.0404 -0.0175 0.9441 
R-Squared 0.3721 0.6988 
Adj. R-Squared 0.3167 0.6722 
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
As observed from the regression models selected above for the pre-IFRS and the post-IFRS 
performance. EBT in pre-IFRS was observed to have explained LLP at 0.3027 units with a 
p-value of 0.000 which is less than the 5% level of significance. While in the post-IFRS EBT 
is explaining the LLP at 0.6570 units with p-value of 0.000 which is also less than the 5% 
level of significance. The independent variables are able to explain 31.67% variation in 
Loan loss provision in the pre IFRS era while the variation as shown in Table 4.1 for post 
IFRS era is 67.22% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
Table 4.2 Pre-IFRS and Post-IFRS Adoption Model with Capital Management 
Regressors 
Fixed effect model Fixed effect model 
Β p-value Β p-value 
MCAR 0.0709 0.3023 0.1157 0.0963 
NPL 0.1085 0.1049 0.0709 0.3852 
SIZE -0.0037 0.4669 -0.0043 0.5586 
AGE -0.0075 0.3295 0.0173 0.0185 
LLA 0.0246 0.8597 0.1022 0.6035 
CFEER 0.8791 0.1876 0.6169 0.1969 
R-Squared 0.1062 0.1681 
Adj. R-Squared 0.2249 0.1401 
F-statistic p-value 0.3926 0.1128 
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As observed from the regression models presented in table 4.2 for the pre-IFRS and the 
post-IFRS performance. MCAR in pre-IFRS was observed to have explained LLP at 0.0709 
units with a p-value of 0.3023 which is greater than the 5% level of significance. While in 
the post-IFRS MCAR is explaining the LLP at 0.1157 units with p-value of 0.0963 which is 
also greater than the 5% level of significance.  
This model result suggests strongly that the MCAR does not have a significant relationship 
with LLP both in the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS. Although, the unit of its explanation on LLP 
changes from 0.0709 to 0.1157 units in the pre-IFRS to post-IFRS adoption periods. This 
also suggests that the adoption of the IFRS increases the not significant performance of 
MCAR on LLP since there is an incremental variation in the MCARs explanatory coefficient 
for the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS adoption periods.   
Since the MCAR’s coefficients p-value of (pre-IFRS=0.3023 & post-IFRS=0.0963) and are 
both greater than 0.05(5%) level of significance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis “LLPs 
has no significant impact on capital management (MCAR) during the post-IFRS adoption for 
listed banks in Nigeria.” and conclude statistically that  there is no significant impact of 
LLPs on capital management (MCAR) during the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS adoption for listed 
banks in Nigeria. 
5.0 Discussion 
The study was carried out with the aim of achieving two specific objectives which were 
hitherto stated in chapter one of this study. Findings from each of the objective reveals as 
follows; 
5.1  Earnings Management; 
i. The test of hypothesis to examine whether the valuation of Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) 
significantly influence earnings management under IFRS adoption for banks under 
consideration. The results in Table 4.1 revealed that earnings before taxes (EBT) is positive 
and significant at 5% level of significance in both the pre and post-adoption of IFRS.  A 
positive and significant relationship between earnings and LLPs would mean that LLPs are 
used as a tool for earnings management. These findings indicate that LLPs are used as a 
tool for earnings management in both periods, but more aggressively so in the post-IFRS 
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period, thus we disagree and reject hypothesis one which states that the valuation of LLPs 
has no significant influence on earnings management after IFRS adoption by listed banks in 
Nigeria. 
ii. The indication is that LLPs are being used for earnings management purposes over the 
entire period of the analysis. The results also indicates that banks with lower earnings have 
an incentive to manipulate by lowering LLPs. This is possible because the expected loss 
approach basis for loan loss provisioning as required by IFRS may allow managers the 
opportunistic behavior. 
iii. Despite the result showing that LLPs being used for earnings management purpose and 
an increase in earning management during the post-IFRS, the study also relate its findings 
with the prudent risk management, which states that When the economic cycle is positive, 
bank loans grow and bank profits tend to be relatively higher, more prudent banks may 
increase their loan loss provisions because these are the times when expected losses are 
generated and growing. 
This finding corroborates the findings of other researchers (refer Ahmed et al. 1999; 
Anandarajan et al. 2003, 2007; Perez et al. 2008; Ozili 2015 and Leventis, et al. 2011who 
reported a significant and positive results relationship between LLP and EBT in the pre and 
post-IFRS period. 
5.2  Capital Management 
i. The result for the MCAR show a positive but not significant at more than 5% level in both 
pre and post-adoption of IFRS for listed banks in Nigeria. This indicates that there is 
relationship between capital management and LLPs but no sufficient evidence that LLPs 
are used to manage capital adequacy ratio in post-IFRS. This finding support and agreed 
with null hypothesis 2, the study accepts the hypothesis that states that LLPs has no 
significant impact on capital management after the IFRS adoption by listed banks in 
Nigeria. However, when CFEER*MCAR is interacted or included, the coefficient is more 
than 5% level of significant. This indicates insufficient evidence that LLPs will be used more 
aggressively to manage capital in the post-IFRS regime. Overall, we conclude that LLPs are 
not used as a tool for capital management. 
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ii. This result agrees with the studies of Anandarajan et al. (2005) and Leventis et al. (2011) 
that examined the use of LLPs and other related tools for capital management. They found 
that capital management is not significant in both pre and post IFRS regimes and banks 
does not use LLPs by inflating loan loss reserves when capital levels were close to violating 
minimum capital regulations. In Nigeria, where the CBN provide prudential guidelines for 
listed banks to guide in their banking operations, therefore it is difficult to violate both the 
IFRS and the CBN prudential guidelines. 
6.0  Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to examine whether loan loss provisions of IFRS has significant 
effect on earnings management and capital management of banks in Nigeria. We conclude 
that in the post-IFRS regime, there were evidence of accentuated earnings management 
behavior using LLPs in the sampled Nigerian listed DMBs. Furthermore, the study also 
found no evidence of capital management through the use of LLPs in the sampled Nigerian 
listed DMBs during the post-IFRS regime.  
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Appendices  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
VAR N 
PostIFRS PreIFRS PostIFRS PreIFRS PostIFRS PreIFRS PostIFRS PreIFRS PostIFRS PreIFRS 
Range Range Minimum Minimum Maximum Maximum Mean Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Deviation 
LLP 75 0.430 0.390 0.000 0.000 0.430 0.390 0.044 0.034 0.088 0.063 
EBT 75 0.510 0.640 -0.010 0.000 0.500 0.640 0.069 0.064 0.106 0.094 
MCAR 75 1.160 0.770 -0.160 -0.130 1.000 0.640 0.208 0.172 0.223 0.173 
NPL 75 0.560 0.620 0.000 0.000 0.560 0.620 0.404 0.334 0.149 0.148 
SIZE 75 9.650 9.250 0.000 0.000 9.650 9.250 7.695 7.314 2.224 1.872 
AGE 75 38.000 47.000 7.000 0.000 45.000 47.000 19.867 14.307 11.377 12.676 
LLA 75 0.390 0.410 0.000 0.000 0.390 0.410 0.017 0.029 0.060 0.060 
CFEER 75 0.190 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.190 0.070 0.016 0.021 0.023 0.014 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 Correlation for the Pre-IFRS Variables 
    LLP EBT MCAR NPL SIZE AGE LLA CFEER 
Pearson Correlation LLP 1 
      
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
  
      
  
Pearson Correlation EBT .562** 1 
     
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.000 
      
  
Pearson Correlation MCAR 0.096 -0.012 1 
    
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.415 0.920 
     
  
Pearson Correlation NPL 0.208 .230* .309** 1 
   
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.073 0.047 0.007 
    
  
Pearson Correlation SIZE -0.109 -0.080 0.219 .270* 1 
  
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.351 0.496 0.059 0.019 
   
  
Pearson Correlation AGE 0.111 0.154 -0.221 0.064 -0.019 1 
 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.344 0.187 0.056 0.583 0.868 
  
  
Pearson Correlation LLA 0.201 0.183 0.132 0.212 0.083 -0.014 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.083 0.116 0.258 0.068 0.480 0.904 
 
  
Pearson Correlation CFEER .353** .261* 0.162 .271* 0.169 -0.150 0.153 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.002 0.023 0.164 0.019 0.147 0.199 0.189   
  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
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Key: 
*LLP: Loan loss provision.  *EBT: Earnings before Taxes.  
*MCAR: is the ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) before loan loss reserve to minimum 
required capital. 
*NPL: is ratio of ratio of loans and advances to customers divided by total bank total asset (LOAN). 
*SIZE: the natural logarithm of total assets capturing the effect of bank size, 
*AGE: is the No. of years the bank has being operating from the date being quoted on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE). 
*LLA: is measure as ratio of loan loss to total assets. *CFEER: is the ratio of commission and fee 
income to total asset. 
Table 3 Correlation for the Post-IFRS Variables 
    LLP EBT MCAR NPL SIZE AGE LLA CFEER 
Pearson Correlation LLP 1.000 
      
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
           
Pearson Correlation EBT .802** 1.000 
     
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.000 
      
  
Pearson Correlation MCAR 0.158 0.157 1.000 
    
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.177 0.177 
     
  
Pearson Correlation NPL 0.032 0.069 0.150 1.000 
   
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.784 0.557 0.200 
    
  
Pearson Correlation SIZE -0.215 -0.025 .230* .517** 1.000 
  
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.064 0.829 0.047 0.000 
   
  
Pearson Correlation AGE 0.003 0.004 -.363** -0.151 -0.198 1.000 
 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.978 0.975 0.001 0.195 0.088 
  
  
Pearson Correlation LLA -0.057 -0.050 0.154 0.006 0.142 -0.161 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.628 0.668 0.186 0.962 0.223 0.169 
 
  
Pearson Correlation CFEER -0.094 -0.039 -0.226 0.090 0.179 -0.044 0.039 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.424 0.741 0.051 0.445 0.125 0.708 0.742   
  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 Source: SPSS output, 2017 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/3 (2018) 170-197 
194 
 
Hausman Test 
Table 4 Hausman Test for pre-IFRS Adoption 
Output for Pre-IFRS Adoption  
(Earnings Management) 
  
Output for Pre-IFRS Adoption  
(Capital Management) 
> phtest (pre.fixed1, pre.random1)   > phtest (pre.fixed1,pre.random1) 
Chi Sqauare 8.414 Chi Sqauare         12.283            
Df 6     df                6 
F-statistic p-value 0.2093 F-statistic p-value 0.05594 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
Table 5 Hausman Test for Post-IFRS Adoption 
Output for Post-IFRS Adoption  
(Earnings Management) 
  
Output for Post-IFRS Adoption  
(Capital Management) 
> phtest (pre.fixed2, pre.random2)   > phtest (pre.fixed2,pre.random2) 
Chi Sqauare 9.996 Chi Sqauare         8.1935            
Df 6     df                6 
F-statistic p-value 0.1248 F-statistic p-value 0.2243 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
 
Table 6 variance Inflation Factor 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 LLP .880 1.136 
NPL .704 1.420 
SIZE .609 1.643 
AGE .831 1.203 
LLA .943 1.060 
CFEER .880 1.137 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
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Table 7 Pre-IFRS Adoption Model with Earnings Management 
 
Dependent Variable: LLP 
Regressors 
Random effect model Fixed effect model Pool effect model 
Β p-value Β p-value β p-value 
EBT 0.3027 0.0000 0.3011 0.0001 0.3018 0.0001 
NPL 0.0259 0.5607 0.0554 0.3510 0.0226 0.6131 
SIZE -0.0046 0.1896 -0.0034 0.4355 -0.0045 0.1876 
AGE 0.0003 0.5255 -0.0011 0.8327 0.0004 0.4597 
LLA 0.0706 0.4981 -0.0336 0.7777 0.0874 0.4023 
CFEER 1.0070 0.0404 0.3045 0.6055 1.1010 0.0234 
R-Squared 0.3721 0.3055 0.3882 
Adj. R-Squared 0.3167 0.0483 0.3342 
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
 
Table 8 Pre-IFRS Adoption Model with Capital Management 
 
Dependent Variable: LLP 
Regressors 
Random effect model Fixed effect model Pool effect model 
Β p-value Β p-value β p-value 
MCAR 0.0264 0.5383 0.0709 0.3023 0.0263 0.5388 
NPL 0.0470 0.3620 0.1085 0.1049 0.0469 0.3628 
SIZE -0.0075 0.0524 -0.0037 0.4669 -0.0075 0.0520 
AGE 0.0008 0.1341 -0.0075 0.3295 0.0008 0.1330 
LLA 0.1416 0.2259 0.0246 0.8597 0.1422 0.2240 
CFEER 1.6069 0.0028 0.8791 0.1876 1.6091 0.0027 
R-Squared 0.2245 0.1062 0.2252 
Adj. R-Squared 0.1561 0.2249 0.1568 
F-statistic p-value 0.0068 0.3926 0.0066 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
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Table 9 Post-IFRS Adoption Model with Earning Management 
 
Dependent Variable: LLP 
Regressors 
Random effect model Fixed effect model Pool effect model 
Β p-value Β p-value Β p-value 
EBT 0.6570 0.0000 0.6830 0.0000 0.6537 0.0000 
NPL 0.0496 0.2611 0.0335 0.4595 0.0629 0.1847 
SIZE -0.0134 0.0002 -0.0184 0.0001 -0.0100 0.0027 
AGE -0.0003 0.6882 0.0006 0.8827 -0.0003 0.6381 
LLA 0.0520 0.6080 0.0853 0.4495 0.0205 0.8393 
CFEER -0.0175 0.9441 0.0617 0.8187 -0.1137 0.6690 
R-Squared 0.6988 0.7256 0.6915 
Adj. R-Squared 0.6722 0.6240 0.6643 
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
 
Table 10 Post-IFRS Adoption Model with Capital Management 
 
Dependent Variable: LLP 
Regressors 
Random effect model Fixed effect model Pool effect model 
Β p-value Β p-value Β p-value 
MCAR 0.1027 0.0747 0.1157 0.0963 0.0922 0.0781 
NPL 0.0896 0.2445 0.0709 0.3852 0.1093 0.1711 
SIZE -0.0117 0.0511 -0.0043 0.5586 -0.0139 0.0138 
AGE 0.0007  0.5712 0.0173 0.0185 0.0003 0.7459 
LLA -0.0215 0.9028 0.1022 0.6035 -0.0549 0.7488 
CFEER 0.2044 0.6476 0.6169 0.1969 0.0342 0.9421 
R-Squared 0.0957 0.1681 0.1199 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0159 0.1401 0.0423 
F-statistic p-value 0.3176 0.1128 0.1771 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
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Table 11 Pre-IFRS and Post-IFRS Model Comparison (Earning Management) 
Pre-IFRS vs Post-IFRS Adoption MODEL with EBT 
Regressors 
Random effect model Random effect model 
Β p-value Β p-value 
EBT 0.3027 0.0000 0.6570 0.0000 
NPL 0.0259 0.5607 0.0496 0.2611 
SIZE -0.0046 0.1896 -0.0134 0.0002 
AGE 0.0003 0.5255 -0.0003 0.6882 
LLA 0.0706 0.4981 0.0520 0.6080 
CFEER 1.0070 0.0404 -0.0175 0.9441 
R-Squared 0.3721 0.6988 
Adj. R-Squared 0.3167 0.6722 
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
 
Table 12 Pre-IFRS and Post-IFRS Model Comparison (Capital Management) 
Pre-IFRS vs Post-IFRS Adoption MODEL with Capital Management 
Regressors 
Fixed effect model Fixed effect model 
Β p-value Β p-value 
MCAR 0.0709 0.3023 0.1157 0.0963 
NPL 0.1085 0.1049 0.0709 0.3852 
SIZE -0.0037 0.4669 -0.0043 0.5586 
AGE -0.0075 0.3295 0.0173 0.0185 
LLA 0.0246 0.8597 0.1022 0.6035 
CFEER 0.8791 0.1876 0.6169 0.1969 
R-Squared 0.1062 0.1681 
Adj. R-Squared 0.2249 0.1401 
F-statistic p-value 0.3926 0.1128 
Source: SPSS output, 2017 
 
 
